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RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN JEWISH LAW
Itamar Rosensweig*
Shua Mermelstein**
ABSTRACT
In this Article, we argue that rights play a central role in Jewish
law. In Section I, we reconstruct Robert Cover’s thesis distinguishing
the West’s jurisprudence of rights from Judaism’s jurisprudence of
obligation. In Section II, we present Rabbi Lichtenstein’s theory that
rights play no central role in Jewish law. We show that the theories of
Rabbi Lichtenstein and Robert Cover have given rise to the idea that
there are no rights in Jewish law, only obligations. In Section III we
develop two types of arguments in support of our position that rights
are central to Jewish law. Our first argument appeals to Hohfeld’s
analysis that rights are correlative of duties. Our second argument
contends that certain mitzvot are best understood as protecting
individuals’ rights. In Section IV we discuss two ideas that underlie
the “no rights in Jewish law camp.” The first idea is that the category
of mitzvah is best interpreted as obligation. The second idea is that an
obligation to obey God’s law implies a law comprised of obligations.
We argue that both of these ideas are misguided.

*

Rabbi Itamar Rosensweig is a maggid shiur at the Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological
Seminary, a dayan at the Beth Din of America, and an assistant professor of
philosophy at Yeshiva University.
**
Rabbi Shua Mermelstein is the Rabbi of Congregation Talmud Torah Adereth El
and is an associate at Davis Polk & Wardwell. He is a graduate of Rabbi Isaac
Elchanan Theological Seminary and the Yale Law School.

2179

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2022

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 4 [2022], Art. 17

2180
I.

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

COVER’S THESIS AND ANALYSIS

In Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order,
Robert Cover distinguishes between a jurisprudence of rights and a
jurisprudence of obligations.1 Cover employs this distinction to
differentiate a society organized around rights from a society
organized around obligations. He then argues that whereas liberal
western societies and law are organized around rights, Jewish society
and law are organized around obligations.
Cover maintains that “‘[r]ights’ are the fundamental category”
in western societies, but “[t]he basic word of Judaism is obligation or
mitzvah.”2 Cover explains:
The word “rights” is a highly evocative one for those of
us who have grown up in the post-enlightenment
secular society of the West. Yet . . . [w]hen I am asked
to reflect upon Judaism and [] rights, [], the first thought
that comes to mind is that the categories are wrong . . .
Judaism has its own categories . . . . The principal word
in Jewish law, which occupies a place equivalent in
evocative force to the American legal system’s “rights,”
is the word “mitzvah” which literally means
commandment but has a general meaning closer to
“incumbent obligation.”3
To illustrate the centrality of obligation in Judaism, Cover cites the
Talmud’s declaration in Kiddushin 31a that it is greater to perform the
commandments out of obligation—as obligated—than to perform the
commandments voluntarily (“out of love”) when one is not obligated
to do them. Cover writes:
One of the great Rabbis of the fourth century, Rabbi
Joseph, who was blind, asked the great question of his
colleagues: Is it greater to do the commandments out of
love when one is not obligated to do them or is it greater
to do the commandments out of obligation? He had at
first assumed that to voluntarily comply with the
commandments though not obligated to do so entailed
1

Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J. L.
& RELIGION 65, 65-73 (1987).
2
Id. at 66.
3
Id. at 65.
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a greater merit. But his colleagues held that to do the
commandments out of obligation—more correctly, to
do them as obligated—was the act which entailed
greater merit. He then offered a feast for the Scholars if
any could demonstrate that the great figure, Rabbi
Judah’s position that the blind were not obligated to do
the commandments was erroneous.4
Cover also points to the fact that in Jewish law “[t]he primary legal
distinction between Jew and non-Jew is that the non-Jew is only
obligated to the 7 Noachide commandments.” 5 Cover offers several
examples and illustrations to motivate his claim distinguishing
Judaism’s jurisprudence of obligation from the West’s jurisprudence
of rights.
A.

The Organization of Social Movements

The first example pertains to the organization of social
movements. Since rights are the fundamental category in western
society,
[s]ocial movements in the United States organize
around rights. When there is some urgently felt need to
change the law or keep it in one way or another a
“Rights” movement is started. Civil rights, the right to
life, welfare rights, etc. The premium that is to be put
upon an entitlement is so coded. When we “take rights
seriously” we understand them to be trumps in the legal
game.6
By contrast, Cover explains, “[i]n Jewish law, an entitlement without
an obligation is a sad, almost pathetic thing.” 7 Therefore, a social
movement organized around rights would have no evocative force:
Where women have been denied by traditional Judaism
an equal participation in ritual, the reasoning of the
traditional legist has been that women are not obligated
in the same way as are men with respect to those ritual
4

Id. at 67.
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id; but see J. L. Mackie, Can there be a Right-Based Moral Theory?, in THEORIES
OF RIGHTS 168, 169 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
5
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matters (public prayer). It is almost a sure sign of a
nontraditional background for someone to argue that
women in Judaism should have the right to be counted
in the prayer quorum, to lead prayer services or be
called to the Torah. Traditionalists who do argue for
women’s participation . . . do so not on the basis of the
rights. They argue rather that the law, properly
understood, does or ought to impose on women the
obligation of public prayer, of study of Torah, etc. For
the logic of Jewish Law is such that once the obligation
is understood as falling upon women, or whomever,
then there is no question of “right” of participation.
Indeed, the public role is a responsibility. 8
Thus, the West’s jurisprudence of rights is such that social movements
organize around rights. Judaism’s jurisprudence of obligations
requires a different basis for such movements: obligations.
B.

Emancipation and Bar Mitzvah

Cover’s second example relates to the emancipation of minors
when they come of age. In Western law, a child who becomes legally
mature is said to be “emancipated” or “free” or “sui juris” (literally, of
one’s right).9 Not so in Jewish law. There, “the child becomes bar or
bat mitzvah, literally one who is of the obligations.”10 Rather than
becoming free or of one’s own right, the child becomes obligated.11
C.

The Rights of Litigants and the Obligations of
Judges

In a third example, Cover asks us to consider “the problem of
the dress of litigants before a tribunal,” where he explains:
In Estelle v. Williams the Supreme Court held that the
defendant had a right to appear at his trial (a jury trial)
dressed in civilian garb of his choice rather than the
convict garb in which he had spent the past days in jail.
8

Cover, supra note 1, at 67-68 (emphasis added).
Id. at 67.
10
Id. at 67.
11
Id.
9
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But, the Court concluded, in the absence of timely
objection by counsel the right was deemed waived or
not exercised.12
Cover argues that the Court’s legal conclusion is only coherent in a
rights-based system and that a different legal conclusion would be
reached in an obligation-based system. Indeed, Cover argues that
Jewish law would have issued a different ruling in Estelle v.
Williams.13 Cover then cites Maimonides’ treatment of a similar issue:
1. A positive commandment enjoins upon the judge the
duty to judge righteously. 2. If one of the parties to a
suit is well clad and the other ill clad, the judge should
say to the former, “either dress him like yourself before
the trial is held or dress like him, then the trial will take
place.”14
For Cover, this example illustrates how in Western rights-based law,
“we tend to have a system which is almost uniquely dependent upon
parties and their representatives asserting their ‘fairness rights’ . . . .”15
By contrast, in Jewish law’s obligation-based system, the emphasis is
placed on “judges fulfilling their fairness obligations.”16
D.

Foundational and Normative Origins

Cover observes that Western society and Judaism locate their
normative-historical origins in different foundational principles.17 The
West locates its origins in the social contract tradition, which begins
with autonomous “free and independent” individuals in a state of
nature.18 Cover explains that “[t]he story behind the term ‘rights’ is
the story of social contract.”19 According to that tradition, “[r]ights are
traded for collective security. But some rights are retained, and . . .
some rights are inalienable.”20 He further explains that “‘[r]ights’ are
12

Id. at 72.
See id. at 72-73.
14
Id. at 72 (citing Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin 21).
15
Id. at 73.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 65-66.
18
Id. at 66.
19
Id.
20
Id.
13
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the fundamental category because it is the normative category which
most nearly approximates that which is the source of the legitimacy of
everything else.”21 The ideal that underlies the Western tradition (“that
which is desired”) is individuals exercising “perfect freedom with all
the alienated rights returned.”22
In contrast to the West’s origins in individual’s autonomy and
rights, Cover locates Judaism’s normative-historical origin in the
“heteronomy” of Sinai, in the obligations imposed by the law
commanded there.23 Cover writes:
Just as the myth of social contract is essentially a myth
of autonomy, so the myth of Sinai is essentially a myth
of heteronomy . . . . The experience at Sinai is not
chosen. The event gives forth the words which are
commandments . . . . All law was given at Sinai and
therefore all law is related back to the ultimate
heteronomous event in which we were chosen-passive
voice . . . . [E]verything was given at Sinai. And, of
course, therefore, all is, was, and has been
commanded—and we are obligated to this command.24
The different normative-historical origins capture the disparate
organizing principles of the two systems. Judaism locates its origins
in the obligations commanded at Sinai. The West locates its origins in
the state of nature where individuals possess inalienable rights.
E.

The Right to an Education and the Obligation to
Educate

Cover also suggests that a society organized around rights and
a society organized around obligations differ in their approach to
guaranteeing education.25 Cover claims that the Western “right to an
education” is “empty” because it fails to pick out the duty-bearer—the
party obligated to make good on the right. 26 Cover explains that “the
‘right to an education’ is not even an intelligible principle unless we
know to whom it is addressed. Taken alone it only speaks to a need.
21

Id.
Id. at 66.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 66-67.
25
Id. at 71-72.
26
Id. at 71.
22
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A distributional premise is missing which can only be supplied through
a principle of ‘obligation.’”27
By contrast, in an obligation-based system, Cover argues, the
problem of locating the duty bearer does not arise:
Jewish law is very firm in its guarantee of an education.
Something approaching universal male schooling was
pursued perhaps two millennia ago . . . . [I]t is clear that
throughout the middle ages [sic] it was the obligation
of families and communities to provide schooling to all
male children . . . . And it did give rise to a system of
schooling unrivaled in its time for educational
opportunity. Yet, it is striking that the Jewish legal
materials never speak of the right or entitlement of the
child to an education. Rather, they speak of the
obligation incumbent upon various providers to make
the education available. It is a mitzvah for a father to
educate his son . . . .28
Cover claims that because it fails to specify the duty-bearer:
The jurisprudence of rights has proved singularly weak
in providing for the material guarantees of life and
dignity flowing from the community to the individual.
While we may talk of the right to medical care, the right
to subsistence, the right to an education, we are
constantly met by the realization that such rhetorical
tropes are empty . . . .29
In this sense, Cover believes that rights-oriented societies struggle to
actualize their “empty” rhetoric. 30
By contrast, “[i]n a jurisprudence of mitzvoth the loaded,
evocative edge is at the assignment of responsibility. It is to the parent
paying tuition . . . that the Law speaks eloquently and persuasively.” 31
For Cover, this example illustrates how the difference between a
rights-based system and an obligation-based system explains (what he
takes to be) the relative success of the educational system in Judaism.
In the Jewish system, education is characterized as an obligation
27

Id.
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 72 (referring to the “jurisprudence of mitzvoth” as one of “obligation”).
28
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incumbent upon a specified duty-bearer, a functionally superior model
to the Western approach where education is characterized as an
entitlement of the right holder.32
F.

Cover’s General Conclusions

Cover makes two evaluative points about the merits of an
obligation-based system over a rights-based system. First, he writes
that a system of obligations is a purposive, telos-driven system: “A
world centered upon obligation is not, really cannot be, an empty or
vain world.”33 However, “[r]ights, as an organizing principle, are
indifferent to the vanity of varying ends. . . . The rights system is
indifferent to ends . . . .”34 The Western system that emphasizes rights,
does not make “any strong claims about the fullness or vanity of the
ends it permits.”35 But in a system of obligations, “because [it] so
strongly bind[s] and locate[s,] the individual must make a strong claim
for the substantive content of that which they dictate.” 36 Cover
approvingly cites Maimonides, who “contrasts the normative world of
mitzvoth with the world of vanity—hebel.”37
Cover’s second evaluative point follows from his analysis of
the right to education. He explains that rights and rights-talk are often
impotent because of the failure to specify the duty bearer.38 Cover then
concludes his paper with the following flourish:
[A]s I scan my own—our own—privileged position in
the world social order . . . it seems to me that the
rhetoric of obligation speaks more sharply to me than
that of rights. Of course, I believe that every child has a
right to decent education and shelter, food and medical
care; of course, I believe that refugees from political
oppression have a right to a haven in a free land; of
course, I believe that every person has a right to work
in dignity and for a decent wage. I do believe and affirm
the social contract that grounds those rights. But more
32

Id.
Id. at 70.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. (emphasis added) (referring to “mitzvoth” as “obligations”).
38
Id. at 72.
33
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to the point I also believe that I am commanded—that
we are obligated—to realize those rights.39
In summary, Robert Cover provides us with a perspicuous analysis,
rich with examples and illustrations, that captures the differences
between Judaism’s jurisprudence of obligation and the West’s
jurisprudence of rights.
II.

RABBI LICHTENSTEIN’S ANALYSIS
A.

Rights in Halakha

Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein, an influential Rosh Yeshiva and
Jewish thinker of the past half century, delivered a paper on
“Individual Rights in Halakhah” at the 1978 Thirteenth American
Israel Dialogue Conference. 40 The theme of the conference was the
comparison of individual rights under Jewish law, American law, and
Israeli law.41 Rabbi Lichtenstein opened his presentation by criticizing
the very formulation of the topic he was asked to address. 42
Lichtenstein writes:
[L]et me begin by noting that the very formulation of
our topic is non- perhaps even anti-Halakhic in
character . . . . [T]o place [rights] at the center of a
Dialogue intended to deal with the legal aspects of the
individual’s place in society—this is non-Halakhic.
“Rights,” natural or other, are the current coin of
Roman legists. They are the legacy of Locke and
Montesquieu, of John Stuart Mill and Martin Luther
King. They are not the lingua franca of the Torah or the
Talmud, of Rabbi Akiba or the Rambam. 43

39

Id. at 73-74.
The Conference was sponsored by the American Jewish Congress. See generally
About Us, AM. JEWISH CONG., https://ajcongress.org/about (last visited Feb. 13,
2022).
41
See, e.g., Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein, The Halakhic Perspective, 45 CONG.
MONTHLY 4, 4 (1978).
42
Id.
43
Id.
40
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Rights, according to Rabbi Lichtenstein, are foreign to Jewish law.
They are not the language of the Torah and its scholars. For Rabbi
Lichtenstein, the notion that rights should play a central role in a
discussion of an individual’s place in society is anti-halakhic. Rights
belong to Western jurisprudence, not to halakha.
Like Cover, Rabbi Lichtenstein maintains that the central
categories of Jewish law are obligation and duty, not rights. “The
central Halakhic categories, in this area as elsewhere, are mitzvah and
hiyuv—commandment and obligation, the individual’s duties rather
than his prerogatives . . . . To anyone familiar with Halakhic thought
and Halakhic values, the point is self-evident.”44 Rights are not part of
the Torah’s language or logic, and they play no central role in Jewish
law.
Another similarity Lichtenstein shares with Cover is that he
sees Western society’s emphasis on rights as flowing from the social
contract tradition, whereas Jewish law’s emphasis on obligation flows
from its conception of the individual as commanded by God:
The point of departure for a Halakhic discussion of the
individual’s rights is thus fundamentally different from
the secularist’s. Philosophically . . . secularism regards
the individual as primordially and inherently invested
with unlimited rights. It is only at a secondary plane
that these are somewhat circumscribed in order, as in
social contract theory, to assure a modus vivendi with
others and thus guarantee the rights of each . . . .
Halakha, on the other hand, regards man as intrinsically
limited . . . by his metaphysical relationship to God. 45
Rabbi Lichtenstein concludes that “[h]alakhah is a form of bondage,”
and that “[h]alakhah rests . . . on a metaphysical view of man as
charged rather than . . . endowed . . . .”46
Rabbi Lichtenstein highlights specific examples that illustrate
his central claim that where western law speaks in the language of
rights, Jewish law speaks in the language of obligation:
Two examples, both drawn from areas in which legal
rights otherwise figure prominently . . . . The normative
thrust of halakhah is reflected in its approach to
44

Id.
Id. at 5.
46
Id. at 5, 7.
45

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss4/17

10

Rosensweig and Mermelstein: Rights and Duties in Jewish Law

2022

RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN JEWISH LAW

2189

reciprocal relationships, in whose formulation mutual
responsibilities loom large. Thus, the Rambam
concludes Hilkhot Sekhirut (“the laws of hire”) with the
following precept: “Just as the employer is enjoined
from embezzling the poor laborer’s wages or detaining
them, so is the poor laborer enjoined from cheating on
the employer’s work and malingering a bit here and a
bit there and spending the whole day disingenuously.
Rather he is obligated to be very strict with himself with
respect to time and to work with all his might.”47
Lichtenstein’s key observation is that, whereas Western law speaks of
the worker’s right to receive his wages, Jewish law speaks of the
employer’s obligation to pay the worker on time. Likewise, when
Western law speaks of the employer’s right to the worker’s labor,
Jewish law speaks of the worker’s obligation to work scrupulously for
his employer.
Thus, Rabbi Lichtenstein and Cover both endorse the thesis
that Judaism is a system of obligations, not a system of rights.
B.

The Theory’s Influence and Reception

The thesis advanced by Professor Cover and Rabbi
Lichtenstein, which distinguishes Judaism as a legal system organized
around obligations as opposed to Western society’s organization
around rights, has been enormously influential. It is not clear to us
whether Cover or Lichtenstein would go so far as to claim that Judaism
has only obligations and no rights. It is possible that Cover intended
to distinguish between Judaism’s rhetoric of obligation from the
Western rhetoric of rights rather than to draw a substantive distinction
between the systems themselves. Similarly, it is possible that Rabbi
Lichtenstein only intended to deny the centrality of rights in Jewish
law, not their existence.
Nevertheless, the thesis advanced by Rabbi Lichtenstein and
Professor Cover has given rise to the idea that there are no rights in
Judaism, only duties. Their thesis has been interpreted to mean that
Jewish law does not recognize or confer rights. It only assigns duties.
Citing Cover, the Encyclopedia Judaica’s entry on human
rights informs us that in Judaism “man is perceived first and foremost
47

Id. at 4.
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as having obligations and not rights.”48 The entry also states that “the
point of departure [in Jewish law] being from obligations rather than
from rights creates a completely different legal system than that
existing in modern constitutional law.”49 Benjamin Porat also
references Cover and concludes that “Jewish law has managed to
function and flourish impressively with (almost) no use of the concept
‘right.’”50 The notion that Jewish law has no rights—only duties—
appears to have struck a chord.
III.

ASSESSING THE THEORY

In this section, we argue against the thesis that there are “no
rights in Jewish law.” We argue that such a thesis is both conceptually
and substantively problematic. Conceptually, the thesis fails to
account for the correlativity of rights and duties. Substantively, the
thesis fails to cohere with substantive principles and doctrines within
Jewish law. We develop these two arguments below.
A.

The Conceptual Objection: The Correlativity of
Rights and Duties in Hohfeld’s Analysis

The most extensive and perhaps influential analysis of rights
was offered by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld in his paper “Some
Fundamental legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning.” 51
Hohfeld notes that the term “rights” has four separate meanings or
usages in legal discourse: liberty-rights, claim-rights, powers, and
immunities.52 The most important meaning for our present purpose is
what Hohfeld calls a “claim-right.” Hohfeld explains that a claim-right
in a right holder always correlates to a duty owed by a duty-bearer to
the right holder.53 Hohfeld writes:

48

17 FRED SKOLNIK & MICHAEL BERENBAUM, ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 310 (2d ed.
2007).
49
Id.
50
Benjamin Porat, Rights-Based Law vs. Duty-Based Law: Old Dilemma, New
Perspectives (manuscript at 6) (on file with authors).
51
See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913).
52
Id. at 30.
53
Id. at 32.
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Recognizing, as we must, the very broad and
indiscriminate use of the term, “right,” what clue do we
find, in ordinary legal discourse, toward limiting the
word in question to a definite and appropriate meaning.
The clue lies in the correlative “duty,” for it is certain
that even those who use the word and the conception
“right” in the broadest possible way are accustomed to
thinking of “duty” as the invariable correlative. 54
Thus, according to Hohfeld, “‘[d]uty’ and ‘right’ are correlative terms.
When a right is invaded, a duty is violated.” 55 Pursuant to his view, to
speak of X’s right held against Y is logically and conceptually
equivalent to speaking of Y’s duty owed to X.56 As Hohfeld explains:
“[I]f X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former’s land, the
correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay
off the place.”57 More generally, A has a claim right “that B φ if and
only if B has a duty to A to φ.”58
Hohfeld’s analysis of claim-rights places significant pressure
on Cover and Lichtenstein’s thesis. Given the correlativity of claimrights and duties, a system of claim-rights is ipso facto a system of
duties—and a system of duties is ipso facto a system of claim-rights.
It is, of course, interesting that some systems of law choose to frame
their norms from the perspective of the right holder, while others frame
their norms from the perspective of the duty bearer.59 However,
semantics aside, the content of a norm formulated as X’s right against
Y is identical to a norm formulated as Y’s duty owed to X.
It follows from Hohfeld’s analysis that many of the duties
imposed by Jewish law also confer rights. For example, the Jewish
law duty to not murder is equivalent, under Hohfeld’s analysis, to an
individual’s right to life. Similarly, the Jewish law duty to support the
poor is equivalent, under Hohfeld’s analysis, to the poor person’s right
54

Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
56
Id.
57
Id. See also THEORIES OF RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 8 (“To say that P has a natural
right to free speech . . . is usually to say . . . that people owe a duty to him not to
interfere with the free expression of his opinions.”).
58
See
Leif
Wenar,
Rights,
STAN.
ENCYC.
PHIL.
ARCHIVE,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/rights/ (last updated Feb. 24,
2020).
59
There may be rhetorical or pedagogical advantages to one over the other. This is
one way of understanding Cover’s thesis discussed above.
55
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to welfare. Likewise, the Jewish law duty to provide a child with an
education is equivalent, under Hohfeld’s analysis, to the child’s right
to an education.60 Thus, Hohfeld’s analysis of claim-rights rules out
the “no rights in Jewish law” assertion. Benjamin Porat’s claim that
“Jewish law has managed to function and flourish impressively with
(almost) no use of the concept of ‘right’” 61 may be true regarding the
word “right,”62 but it is false regarding the concept of “right.”
B.

The Substantive Objection

Our second argument against the “no rights in Jewish law”
theory is that it is inconsistent with substantive principles and doctrines
within Jewish law. Beyond the implications of the Hohfeldian analysis
of the previous section, which would allow us to infer Y’s right
whenever X has a duty to Y, our claim in this section is that a cleareyed analysis of Jewish law reveals that halakha is full of rights
protecting an individual’s entitlements. In some instances, we claim
Jewish law is explicitly interested in securing an individual’s right.
Further, even where Jewish law does not explicitly speak in the
language of rights, “rights” are often inherent in a given set of norms.
We contend that the failure to appreciate these rights can lead to an
incomplete and inaccurate picture of the halakhic norms in question.
Our goal in this section is not to provide a comprehensive list of such
halakhic rights. Rather, our purpose is to offer a few examples that
60

The same is true in the other direction. The rights conferred by the legal systems
of the West impose duties on others to supply those rights.
61
Porat, supra note 50.
62
Of course, this is almost trivially true, since the word “right” is an English one.
Note that the Hebrew word “mishpat,” in some contexts, appears to denote ‘rights.’
See, e.g., Deut. 18:3 (“the right of the priests”); Deut. 21:17 (“the right of the
firstborn”); I Samuel 8:11 (“the right of kings”); Exodus 21:9 (“all the rights of a
daughter”); Job 36:6 (“give to the poor their right”); Isaiah 10:2 (“to take away the
right of the poor”). In what appears to be a related meaning, the word “mishpat” also
denotes one’s “due” or “needs”. See, e.g., Exodus 28:30 according to the
commentary of Hizkuni ad loc (“Aaron shall bear the needs of Israel”); I Kings 8:59
according to the commentary of Radak and Metzudat David ad loc (“to provide for
the needs of His people Israel”). These two meanings (right and needs) are naturally
related. A right protects a person’s need and secures that which is due to him. See
also Ramban Exodus 15:25, suggesting that “mishpat” denotes a law that is properly
measured and fairly distributed. Ramban’s comment appears to come close to a
notion of distributive justice, where law (or mishpat) properly protects individuals’’
needs and what is due to them—i.e., their rights.
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illustrate our main claim. A careful and systematic analysis of Jewish
law would allow these examples to be multiplied several-fold.
C.

The Worker’s Right to Eat During Production

Our first example is that of the agricultural worker’s right in
Jewish law to eat from the food he produces for his employer. This
right is widely recognized, and it is codified by commentators as one
of the 613 biblical commandments. 63 In three places, Maimonides
characterizes this mitzvah as an entitlement of the worker, writing that
it is a biblical commandment (mitzvah) “that the worker shall [be
entitled to] eat the produce [of the employer] that he labors on.”64 This
right, like all claim-rights, correlates to a duty incumbent upon the
employer, which Maimonides also formulates in his discussion of the
rules associated with the mitzvah: “[T]he employer is obligated to
allow the worker to consume from what he produces.”65
But, in three places, Maimonides singles out the worker’s right
to eat as the essence of the mitzvah—in his Sefer ha-Mitzvot, in his
short summary of the mitzvot, and in his introduction to the Laws of
Sekhirut.66 This emphasis is consistent with the underlying rationale
of the mitzvah articulated by some commentators who explain that the
mitzvah is designed to protect the worker’s interests.67 Since it is
natural for a person to crave the food that he produces with his own
hand, it would be inhumane to deny the worker the right to enjoy (some
of) the food he produces, even though it “belongs” to the employer. 68
In this example, the mitzvah is explicitly formulated by Maimonides
as a worker’s entitlement, and according to the explanation of these

63

See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Mitzvot Positive Commandments, no. 201; Sefer haHinukh, Mitzvah no. 576; Sefer Mitzvot Gadol (Semag) Positive Commandments,
no. 91; Sefer ha-Battim, Mitzvah no. 202.
64
See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Mitzvot Positive Commandments no. 201; Mishneh
Torah, Koteret to Hilkhot Sekhirut Mitzvah no. 4; Minyan ha-Katzar, Mitzvah no.
201. The quoted language is a direct English translation provided by the authors of
this article.
65
Mishneh Torah, Sekhirut 12:1.
66
See Sefer ha-Mitzvot Aseh 201; Mishneh Torah, Koteret to Hilkhot Sekhirut,
Mitzvah no. 4; Minyan ha-Katzar 201.
67
Rabbenu Bahya, Deuteronomy 23, 25; Sefer ha-Battim, Mitzvah no. 202.
68
See Rabbenu Bahya, Deuteronomy 23, 25; Sefer ha-Battim, Mitzvah no. 202.
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other commentators, the mitzvah’s underlying goal is to protect the
humane labor conditions of the worker. 69
The striking feature of this example is that the commandment
(mitzvah) is characterized primarily as conferring a right upon the
worker, not as bestowing an obligation upon the employer.
D.

Rule-Conferring Mitzvot and Rights

The previous example demonstrates that some mitzvot are in
fact conceived of, and formulated as, rights. In the example to follow,
we argue that a significant portion of the mitzvot that comprise Jewish
civil law are not formulated as duties. Rather, they are conceived of
as power-conferring rules (dinim), a large subset of which generate
individual rights. Take for example the mitzvot governing torts. The
236th positive mitzvah, Maimonides writes, is “that He instructed us
with the rules governing personal injury.” 70 Maimonides also codifies
the “rules governing ox [damages,]” “the rules governing pit
[damages,]” and “the rules” of other forms of damages as mitzvot. 71
These mitzvot are not formulated as duties but rather as rules (dinim).
Furthermore, when we analyze the substantive provisions of these
rules, it is clear that many of them confer rights. Consider
Maimonides’ discussion of trespassing animals in the fifth chapter of
the Laws of Monetary Torts. Maimonides writes:
A grazing animal that trespasses and enters private
land, even if it has not yet caused damage, [the
landowner] can warn the animal’s owner . . . if [after
three warnings] the animal owner still fails to prevent
his animal from trespassing, the landowner has the right
(lit. is permitted) to [preemptively] slaughter the
animal...72
This provision confers upon a landowner the right to preemptively
seize trespassing cattle in order to protect his own property.
This example illustrates a larger phenomenon within Jewish civil law.
Maimonides formulates the mitzvot governing the realms of torts,
69

Rabbenu Bahya, Deuteronomy 23:25; Sefer ha-Battim, Mitzvah no. 202.
Sefer ha-Mitzvot, Mitzvah no. 236.
71
See Mishneh Torah, Koteret to the Laws of Monetary Torts; Sefer ha-Mitzvot,
Mitzvah nos. 240-41.
72
See Sanhedrin 2:12.
70
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property, contracts, bailments, estates and inheritance as rules
(dinim)—“that He instructed us with the rules (be-din) of X.”73 An
analysis of these “rules” reveals that many of them confer rights. 74
E.

Charity and the Right to Welfare

We now turn to a third type of counterexample to the belief that
there are “no rights in Jewish law.” In this section, we argue that for
some mitzvot, even if they are formulated as a duty, their main
normative and moral emphasis lie in the right that they generate.
Consider, for example, the mitzvah of charity (tzedakah). Maimonides
clearly formulates tzedakah as an obligation incumbent upon the giver.
In two places, Maimonides formulates the positive commandment “to
give charity . . . .”75 Charity, in theory, could be conceptualized so as
to emphasize the duty of the giver instead of the right (or entitlement)
of the recipient. Virtue ethicists might say that the duty of charity is to
facilitate the giver’s virtue of benevolence. For example, some writers
characterize a Christian conception of charity according to which
“[a]lmsgiving was understood as a means to redemption” for the
wealthy, not a means to aid the poor. 76 As one writer puts it, “God
could have made all men rich, but He wanted there to be poor people
in this world, that the rich might be able to redeem their sins.”77 These
views clearly place the moral emphasis of charity on the giver’s duty,
rather than on the recipient’s right.
Although Jewish law clearly formulates the mitzvah of
tzedakah as an obligation incumbent upon the giver, the substantive
halakhic rules of charity reflect the halakha’s emphasis on protecting
the rights of the recipient. Thus, we argue that the Jewish law
73

See e.g., Sefer ha-Mitzvot Mitzvah 242- 244 (the rules of bailments), 245 (the rules
of acquisitions), 248 (the rules of estates).
74
See e.g., Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 27b-28a (establishing a right to selfhelp, the rule of avid inish dina le-nafsheih); Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 108a
and Mishneh Torah, Neighbors 12:5 (conferring the right of first refusal on the owner
of abutting land); Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 10a (establishing the right of a
worker to withdraw from an employment contract without penalty); Mishneh Torah
Mechirah 12:13-15 (discussing the right to invalidate a transaction when the item or
its value has been misrepresented, the rule of mekach ta‘ut).
75
Sefer ha-Mitzvot Minyan ha-Katzar 195; Mishneh Torah, Koteret to Hilkhot
Matnot ‘Aniyim no. 12.
76
SAMUEL FLEISCHACKER, A SHORT HISTORY OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 64 (Harvard
Univ. Press ed., 2004).
77
Id. at 2; see also Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 10a.
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obligation to give charity can be seen as deriving from the right of the
poor person to welfare. Put differently, the right of the poor person to
welfare is more fundamental than the giver’s duty. This is because it
is the poor person’s right that grounds the giver’s duty.78
We draw attention to three halakhic rules that support this
conclusion. First, the amount of charity that one is obligated to give is
determined by the needs of the poor.79 The fact that the parameters of
the obligation are filled out by the welfare rights and needs of the
recipient implies that tzedakah, despite being formulated as an
obligation, actually flows from the right of the poor to have their needs
met.80 It is the right of the poor to have their needs met that gives rise
to the duty to give charity.
Second, Jewish law conceives of tzedakah as a legally
enforceable debt. If an individual is disinclined to give charity, or fails
to do so, the court is authorized to seize his assets to satisfy the needs
of the poor.81 As such, the Jewish law conception of tzedakah is closer
to our conception of taxation than to our contemporary notion of
charitable giving. Commentators are puzzled by this feature of
tzedakah, since affirmative personal obligations comparable to
tzedakah are generally not enforceable in Jewish law.82 Jewish law
authorities explain that the court’s power to seize assets flows from the
poor individual’s right to welfare, not from the giver’s obligation.83
According to these authorities, an analysis that focuses exclusively on
One helpful way to think about our claim is to consider Joseph Raz’s definition of
a right. Raz holds that an individual has a right if, and only if, an aspect of his wellbeing is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty. See
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 166-72 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1986).
Under Raz’s theory, “rights are grounds of duties in others.” Id. (“[I]f an individual
has a right then a certain aspect of his well-being is a reason for holding others to be
under a duty.”). Likewise, we argue that even though the Jewish law obligation of
tzedakah is formulated as a duty on the giver, the reason for that duty is explained by
the more fundamental right of the recipient.
79
See Tur, Yoreh De’ah 249:1; Mishneh Torah, Matnot Aniyim 7:3.
80
See RAZ, supra note 78. Returning to Joseph Raz’s definition of rights, we can
say that an aspect of the poor person’s well-being is the reason for holding the giver
to be under a duty.
81
See Bava Batra 8b; Shulchan Arukh Yoreh De’ah 248:1.
82
See Tosafot, Bava Batra 8b, s.v. Akhfeih; Beit Yosef Yoreh De’ah 248:1. See also
RABBI MOSHE BEN NACHMAN (RAMBAN), DINA DE-GARMI 129-30 (Moshe Hirshler
ed., 1969).
83
Arukh ha-Shulhan Yoreh De’ah 240:6. See also Ritva Ketubot 49b; Radbaz,
Matnot ‘Aniyim 7:10.
78
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the giver’s tzedakah obligation cannot explain the court’s power to
seize assets for tzedakah. Rather, it is the welfare entitlement of the
poor individual that explains the novel halakhic rule. This implies that
the mitzvah of tzedakah is driven by the right of the poor to have their
needs met.
Third, closely related to the previous point, some authorities
hold that if a wealthy individual refuses to give charity altogether, a
poor person has the right to seize (without court intervention) some of
the wealthy individual’s personal assets to satisfy his basic needs.
Furthermore, these authorities hold that if the poor person can
demonstrate that he has proper standing—i.e., he is the closest relative
or neighbor, which Jewish law prioritizes for tzedakah over other
recipients—he has a right to seize the wealthy individual’s
possessions. This applies even when the wealthy individual is ready
and willing to give charity to a different recipient. 84 Viewed solely
from the perspective of the giver’s obligation, it is not clear how we
can make sense of the poor person’s power to seize the wealthy
individual’s assets. However, when viewed from the perspective of
the poor person’s rights, the legal holding of these authorities is quite
natural. The poor individual is entitled to seize assets to vindicate his
legal rights. This suggests that the recipient’s right to welfare is a
fundamental component of Judaism’s conception of tzedakah. Thus,
our discussion of tzedakah demonstrates that, even where Jewish law
formulates a mitzvah as an obligation, that obligation may in fact be
grounded in the rights of the correlative beneficiary.
F.

Section Summary: Mitzvot are not Reducible to
Obligations

The examples covered in this section reflect three different
types of counterexamples to the idea that Jewish law has no rights. The
first example of the agricultural laborer’s right to consume the food he
produces illustrates that some mitzvot are explicitly formulated as
rights. The second example illustrates that many mitzvot are
formulated as rule-conferring (dinim) rather than duty-generating, and
a careful analysis of the rules conferred by these mitzvot demonstrates
that they often confer individual rights. The third example illustrates
how, even when a mitzvah is explicitly formulated as an obligation, its
84

See Machaneh Ephraim Zekhiyah u-Matanah 8; Gilyon Maharsha, Shulchan
Arukh Yoreh De’ah 248:1.
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substantive provisions reflect that its moral edge and emphasis lies in
the right that it confers. In our example, it is the poor person’s right to
welfare that grounds the giver’s obligation of tzedakah.
This last example puts significant pressure on Benjamin Porat’s
thesis. Porat claims that even if Hohfeld is correct that rights and
duties are correlative of each other, the fact that Jewish law formulates
its rules in terms of duties establishes that the right is merely a
byproduct or an epiphenomenon of the duty. 85 According to Porat, the
duty is always more fundamental than the right in Jewish law. The
tzedakah example, however, suggests the opposite. Even when Jewish
law formulates a mitzvah as a duty, the moral emphasis and edge of
the mitzvah may nevertheless lie in the right it confers. As between
the right and the duty of tzedakah, the right is more fundamental.
IV.

TWO IDEAS THAT ANIMATE THE NO RIGHTS IN JEWISH LAW
THESIS
A.

Mitzvah: Commandment or Obligation

The idea that Judaism consists of duties and no rights appears
to be motivated by two ideas. The first is that Judaism is a system of
mitzvot and that the concept of a mitzvah is best translated and
understood as “obligation.” As we noted earlier, we are skeptical of
that claim. The examples surveyed from the previous section—and,
again, these examples can be multiplied—indicate that it is incorrect
to characterize mitzvot as uniquely generating obligations. In fact,
these examples, especially the category of dinim (rule-conferring
mitzvot) suggest a much broader conclusion. “Mitzvah” should not be
understood as “obligation” at all. Strictly speaking, the word mitzvah
denotes “commandment.”86
See, e.g., Porat, supra note 50, at 10 (“[T]he limited talmudic recognition of rights
is only of rights as acquired, not of rights as innate.”).
86
Robert Alter, in his translation of the Bible, consistently translates the word
“mitzvah” as “command” or "commandment.” See, e.g., Exodus 24, 12; Leviticus 4,
2; Deuteronomy 5, 28; 6, 1; 6, 25. The Jewish Publication Society (“JPS”) HebrewEnglish Tanakh often translates the word “mitzvah” as “instruction.” For example,
see its rendering of Deuteronomy 5, 28; 6, 1; 6, 25. See also MARCUS JASTROW,
DICTIONARY OF THE TARGUMIM, TALMUD BAVLI, TALMUD YERUSHALMI AND
MIDRASHIC LITERATURE p. 823 (1971) (demonstrating how the Talmud translates
mitzvah as “command”). Solomon Mandelkern, in his Concordance on the Bible,
renders “mitzvah” as “precept” or “law.” SOLOMON MANDELKERN, CONCORDANCE
85
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Recall Cover’s formulation that “the principal word in Jewish
law . . . is the word ‘mitzvah’ which literally means commandment but
has a general meaning closer to ‘incumbent obligation.’”87 We agree
with Cover that the word means “commandment”; however, we do not
agree with Cover’s claim that the word’s “general meaning” is closer
to “incumbent obligation.”88
Rabbi Lichtenstein also appears to conflate the concept of a
commandment with that of an obligation. He writes, “[t]he central
Halakhic categories, in this area as elsewhere, are mitzvah and hiyuv—
commandment and obligation, the individual’s duties rather than his
prerogatives.”89 Here, Lichtenstein appears to reduce both the concept
of commandment (mitzvah) and obligation (hiyuv) to that of duty.
Technically, the word mitzvah derives from tzivah, meaning
“he commanded,” and denotes the “commandment” itself. 90
Understood this way, the concept of mitzvah is best understood as the
“command of the sovereign” or the “law of the lawgiver.” 91 This is
quite distinct from the concept of obligation. As a logical matter, it is
quite possible for the lawgiver to command that X shall be entitled to
possess Z, or that X shall have the right to Φ. The concept of a
“commandment” is consistent with a command conferring rights.
Think of a noble host entertaining company for dinner who commands
his butler that the distinguished dinner guest shall have the right to a
second portion. Or consider the command of a sovereign declaring
that women shall have the right to vote. We see nothing in the concept
of commandment—or mitzvah—to suggest that commandments must

BIBLE [p. 990] (Shulsinger Bros. 1955). In Reuben Alcalay’s EnglishHebrew Dictionary, he does not provide the Hebrew word “mitzvah” as a translation
of the English “obligation” or of the English “duty.” [Vol. 2] RUBEN ALCALAY, THE
COMPLETE ENGLISH-HEBREW DICTIONARY [p. 2510] (Massadah Publ’g Co. 1975).
But, he does provide “mitzvah” as a translation of the English “commandment.” Id.
In Alcalay’s Hebrew-English Dictionary, he renders the Hebrew word “mitzvah” as
“command, behest, commandment, precept, law.” [Vol. 2] RUBEN ALCALAY, THE
COMPLETE ENGLISH-HEBREW DICTIONARY [p. 1457] (Massadah Publ’g Co. 1964).
But he also acknowledges that it is sometimes used to connote “religious duty,
obligation.” Id.
87
Cover, supra note 1, at 65.
88
See id.
89
Lichtenstein, supra note 41, at 4.
90
Cover, supra note 1, at 65.
91
Note especially the JPS’s rendering of mitzvah as “instruction” and Mandelkern’s
rendering of it as “precept” or “law.” Supra, n. 86.
ON THE
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Nothing prevents commandments from

The Duty to Obey the Law and the Law’s
Substantive Content

The second idea motivating the “no rights in Jewish law” thesis
is the thought that because we are obligated to obey God’s commands,
the commandments themselves must constitute a system of
obligations. This idea underlies Rabbi Lichtenstein’s analysis. After
noting that the normative thrust of Judaism lies in its assignment of
obligations and responsibilities rather than in the conferral of rights,
Rabbi Lichtenstein explains that:
The normative thrust of Halakhic law and ethics is not,
of course accidental. It is rooted in a metaphysical and
theological base. Halakha regards the individual – man
in general but the Jew in particular – as God’s servant.
The Torah is clear and emphatic on this point. “For
unto Me the children of Israel are servants; they are My
servants whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt:
I am the Lord your God.” . . . Halakha speaks of human
bondage.92
But Rabbi Lichtenstein’s analysis conflates two separate ideas.
One idea pertains to the normative reasons for obeying God’s law.
Here, Rabbi Lichtenstein explains that man as servant ought to obey
God’s command.93 The second idea pertains to the substantive content
of the law, the content of God’s particular commands. Rabbi
Lichtenstein appears to maintain that, because man is obligated to obey

92
93

Lichtenstein, supra note 41, at 4-5.
Id. at 5. Here Lichtenstein elaborates:
This bondage is grounded in two principles. It derives, in part, from the
sheer metaphysical and existential chasm between man and God, from the
fact that, given their respective natures, one ought to be servant and the
other master. It derives, equally, not only from what God is but from what
He does and/or has done, from His role as creator, sustainer and provider
and from man’s corresponding position of dependence. “They are My
servants whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt.” Whatever the
basis, however, the reality should be clear. Halakha speaks of human
bondage.

Id. (emphasis in original).
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God’s laws, the substantive content of the law must also be comprised
of individuals’ obligations, not their rights.94
We believe this is a mistake. The underlying normative
reasons that make God’s commands obligatory and binding are distinct
from the substantive content of those commands—to wit, whether
God’s commands confer rights or impose duties.95 Cover also appears
to conflate these two concepts. For instance, Cover attempts to
motivate his thesis that Jewish law is comprised of obligations, not
rights, by appealing to the normative basis of the law—that it was all
commanded at Sinai and that “we are obligated to obey that
command.”96 Like Rabbi Lichtenstein, Cover believes that an
obligation to obey the law implies a law comprised of obligations.
Cover and Rabbi Lichtenstein’s general thesis appears to stem
from the idea that, if the normativity of the law stems from a duty to
obey God’s commands, then the commandments themselves are just
duties owed to God. The thought is that even if God commands that a
poor person shall have a “right to welfare,” my duty to make good on
that right is not in fact owed to the poor individual. It is a duty owed
to God. The poor individual is merely an occasion for me to satisfy
my duty owed to God, and the entitlement of the poor individual is a
Id. at 4. Rabbi Lichtenstein’s discussion of the reciprocal responsibilities of the
employer and worker is clearly about the law’s substantive content, not about the
normative reasons for obeying the law.
95
John Mackie makes a similar point about Kant’s moral philosophy. Mackie, supra
note 7, at 169. Even if Kant’s moral philosophy is at bottom a duty-based system
grounded in the categorical imperative, that system nevertheless confers rights upon
individuals:
94

It is conceivable that sets of goals and rights should follow from a single
fundamental duty. Kant, for example, attempts to derive the principle of
treating humanity as an end from the categorical imperative, “Act only on
that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should
become a universal law.” Taken as literally as it can be taken, the principle
of treating humanity--that is, persons, or more generally rational beings-as an end would seem to set up a goal. But it could well be interpreted as
assigning rights to persons. Alternatively it could be argued that some
general assignment of rights would follow directly from the choice of
maxims which one could will to be universal. In either of these ways rights
might be derived from duties.

Id. In any event, it is clear from Kant’s Doctrine of Right that the categorical
imperative—the fundamental duty of Kant’s moral system—is intended to generate
an entire system of rights. See Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge
University Press, 1996).
96
See Cover, supra note 1, at 67 (“[In Judaism] all is, was, and has been commandedand we are obligated to this command.”).
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mirage, an epiphenomenon of the duty owed to God. Furthermore, to
return to our earlier example of the noble host, the present view would
hold that the butler owes a duty to his master; when the guest requests
seconds, the butler satisfies the duty he owes to his master. The guest
is merely an occasion for the butler to fulfill his obligation to the
master.
H.L.A. Hart explicitly advances this conception of religious
law. Further, Hart appeals to this conception of religious law to deny
that Jewish law confers rights. In his work on rights, Hart discusses
“codes of behavior which do not purport to confer rights but only to
prescribe what shall be done.”97 Hart writes:
[T]here are of course many types of codes of behavior
which only prescribe what is to be done . . . . It would
be absurd to regard these codes as conferring rights . . .
[E]ven a code which is plainly a moral code need not
establish rights; the Decalogue is perhaps the most
important example. Of course, quite apart from
heavenly rewards human beings stand to benefit by
general obedience to the Ten Commandments:
disobedience is wrong and will certainly harm
individuals. But it would be a surprising interpretation
of them that treated them as conferring rights. 98
Hart interprets the Ten Commandments as a moral code that prescribes
“what is to be done” by imposing obligations. He explicitly denies that
the Ten Commandments confer rights.
Why is Hart opposed to viewing the Ten Commandments–
which, inter alia, command individuals to not murder, to not steal,
etc.–as conferring rights? Hart explains:
In such an interpretation obedience to the Ten
Commandments would have to be conceived as due to
or owed to individuals, not merely to God, and
disobedience not merely as wrong but as a wrong to (as
well as harm to) individuals. The Commandments
would cease to read like penal statutes designed only to
rule out certain types of behavior and would have to be
thought of as rules placed at the disposal of individuals
97
98

H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 182 (1995).
Id.
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and regulating the extent to which they may demand
certain behavior from others. Rights are typically
conceived of as possessed or owned by, or belonging to
individuals, and these expressions reflect the
conception of moral rules as not only prescribing
conduct but as forming a kind of moral property of
individuals to which they are as individuals entitled;
only when rules are conceived in this way can speak of
rights . . . .99
Hart maintains that Jewish law cannot generate obligations owed to
individuals—only to God. He holds that it is the nature of divine law
that its duties and obligations are owed exclusively to God.
From Hart’s perspective, religious law cannot confer rights
because that would suggest that God’s commands generate duties that
are not merely owed to God but also to individuals.100 We disagree.
Instead, we are persuaded that Jewish law imposes duties that are owed
to individuals and confers rights that belong to them. We believe that
Jewish law confers rights that genuinely form, to borrow Hart’s
language, “a kind of moral property of individuals to which they are as
individuals entitled.”101 In fact, some of these are evident in the three
examples we cited earlier. As we discussed above, some mitzvot, such
as the agricultural worker’s right to consume the food he produces, are
clearly rights that belong to the individual. In the case of tzedakah, the
duty is clearly owed to the disadvantaged person, and it is his
prerogative to vindicate his right by seizing the resources of the
wealthy person who refuses to participate in tzedakah. Furthermore,
the example of dinim that was previously discussed—mitzvot that are
power-conferring rules—is exactly the category that Hart sees as
quintessential of rights.102 The mitzvot that are constituted by the rules
of torts, property, contracts, bailments, estates, and inheritance are
precisely “rules placed at the disposal of individuals and regulating the
extent to which they may demand certain behavior from others.” 103

99

Id.
Id.
101
Id.
102
See supra notes 71-74.
103
See supra notes 71-74.
100
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Taking Bein Adam la-Chaveiro Seriously

We now discuss two principles within Jewish law that reinforce
our position that many of the mitzvot governing conduct between
individuals are in fact duties owed to individuals, that these halakhic
rules are in fact placed at the disposal of individuals, and that these
rights belong to them. Consider first the idea of teshuvah (atonement)
in Jewish law. Maimonides distinguishes between wrongdoings
committed against God (‘aveirot bein adam la-makom) and
wrongdoings committed against other individuals.104 Maimonides
writes:
Repentance [before God] and Yom Kippur atone only
for wrongdoings that are [exclusively] between man
and God, such as one who eats forbidden food . . . but
wrongdoings that are between individuals, such as one
who injures another . . . or steals from him, and the like,
are such that the wrongdoer cannot receive atonement
until he makes restitution to the individual [he has
wronged] and appeases him . . . . He (the wrongdoer)
must appease him (the individual he has wronged) and
request forgiveness from him.105
Here Maimonides holds that for wrongdoings committed against God,
it is sufficient for one to repent before God to achieve atonement.
However, for wrongdoings committed against other individuals, the
wrongdoer cannot achieve atonement until he has reconciled with the
party he wronged. The wrongdoer’s atonement depends on the
forgiveness of the victim. The fact that wrongdoings committed
against another individual under Jewish law cannot be rectified
without that individual granting forgiveness suggests that mitzvot
governing interpersonal conduct are truly duties owed to individuals
and rights that belong to them. The wrongdoer cannot be released from
his violation until the victim, whom he has wronged, releases him.
Thus, the duties governing interpersonal relationships (bein adam lachaveiro) are not merely duties owed to God.
The second Jewish law principle that supports our conclusion
is that of pesharah. In a nutshell, the principle of pesharah provides
that notwithstanding the fact that Jewish law offers comprehensive
104
105

Mishneh Torah, Teshuvah 2:9.
Id.
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provisions of civil law governing property rights, torts, contracts,
estates, sales, transfers, and the like, that would determine the outcome
of beit din litigation, Jewish law generally allows, and even
encourages, parties to a dispute to waive their rights and to settle their
disagreements amicably in a manner that suits them.106 Put differently,
Jewish law does not insist that civil disputes (dinei mammon) be
resolved in accordance with the strict provisions of its own rules if the
parties are content to settle on their own. In fact, it is considered a
mitzvah for the parties to forgo their formal legal entitlements and to
settle.107 When the parties cannot reach a settlement on their own, it is
considered praiseworthy for them to authorize the presiding judge to
impose a settlement that would resolve the dispute amicably and in a
manner that is beneficial to both parties. 108 Of course, parties are not
required to authorize the judge to do pesharah (court-imposed
settlement), but they are encouraged to do so. 109
The fact that Jewish law allows the parties to settle their dispute
on their own and to bypass the substantive provisions of its civil law
reflects that the provisions of its civil law are largely aimed at securing
the rights and entitlements of the individuals themselves. If the parties
are amenable to resolving their dispute amicably or through a courtimposed settlement—all the better. Their rights are the ones being
protected by the system of Jewish law; therefore, it is up to them to
decide whether to assert or waive their rights in favor of a mutually
acceptable settlement. This suggests that many of the civil law
obligations of Jewish law are primarily owed to other individuals; they
are not duties owed exclusively to God. It is the party whose
entitlements are being protected that has the power to waive them,
settle the case, and resolve the dispute in a manner that diverges from
the statutes and legal provisions of Jewish civil law.110 This implies
that Jewish law sees no value in enforcing the particular duties of its
See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 6b-7a; Riaz Kuntrus ha-Ra’ayot, Sanhedrin
5b; Shakh Choshen, Mishpat 12:6.
107
See Rashi, Deuteronomy 6, 8; Ramban, Deuteronomy 6, 18; Babylonian Talmud,
Sanhedrin 6b-7a; Bava Metzia 30b.
108
See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 6b-7a; Shulchan Arukh Choshen, Mishpat 12;
Derishah 12:2.
109
See Sanhedrin 5b; Rabbi Itamar Rosensweig, Pesharah vs. Din, JEWISHPRUDENCE
(Apr. 21, 2020), https://bethdin.org/pesharah-vs-din (providing an overview of
Pesharah).
110
For a clear statement that it is at the parties’ discretion to decide how they wish to
resolve their dispute, see Shulchan Arukh Choshen, Mishpat 12:2.
106

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2022

27

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 4 [2022], Art. 17

2206

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

civil law (dinei mammon) separate from protecting the interests of the
party whose rights are being protected.
Both of these principles—that of atonement for interpersonal
wrongdoings and that of pesharah—exhibit the features of what
H.L.A. Hart calls the choice theory of rights (sometimes referred to as
the “will theory of rights”). According to this theory, the essence of a
right is that it makes the right holder “a small scale sovereign.”111 To
wit,
the function of a right is to give its holder control over
another’s duty. Your property right . . . contains a power
to waive (or annul, or transfer) others’ duties. You are
the “sovereign” of your computer, in that you may
permit others to touch it or not at your discretion.
Similarly a promisee is “sovereign” over the action of
the promisor: a promisee has a right because she has the
power to waive (or annul) the promisor’s duty to keep
the promise.112
Both of the principles we discussed in this section—atonement for
interpersonal wrongdoings and pesharah—capture the idea that the
right holder has the power to waive or annul the other’s duty. 113 In
both cases, the right holder has the power to annul the perpetrator’s
wrongdoing by releasing him from culpability.
Of course, many of the mitzvot are duties owed exclusively to
114
God.
Jewish law designates this category of mitzvot as “bein adam
la-makom,” literally commandments between man and God. 115 Our
central claim is that the other category of mitzvot—those bein adam
la-chaveiro (literally, between individuals)—genuinely confers rights
111

H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL
THEORY 183 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1982).
112
Wenar, supra note 58.
113
We do not wish to imply that Jewish law endorses H.L.A. Hart’s “choice theory”
of rights over, say, an “interest” theory of rights. We believe that rights in Jewish
law also exhibit the features of an “interest” theory of rights, as we indicated above
in our discussion of Tzedakah and Raz’s definition of rights. Supra, notes 78 and 80.
Here, our point is simply that rights in Jewish law also exhibit the features of the
choice theory in making the right holder a small-scale sovereign over the dutybearer’s obligation. See Wenar, supra note 58 (discussing the choice and interest
theories of rights).
114
For the distinction between mitzvot bein adam la-chaveiro and mitzvot bein adam
la-makom, see Mishnah Yoma 8:9.
115
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss4/17

28

Rosensweig and Mermelstein: Rights and Duties in Jewish Law

2022

RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN JEWISH LAW

2207

upon individuals and generate duties owed to them. More to the point,
we fear that the “no rights in Jewish law thesis,” like Hart’s analysis,
fails to appreciate the distinction between mitzvot bein adam lachaveiro and bein adam la-makom, because it reduces our halakhic
obligations to others into instances of bein adam la-makom—that is,
into mere instances of satisfying duties owed to God.
Put differently, the “no rights in Jewish law” camp sees no
fundamental difference between the obligation to, for example, not
wear clothing made of wool and linen (kelayim) and the obligation to
not harm one’s neighbor. 116 Both are obligations owed exclusively
God. In their view, interacting with one’s neighbor is a mere occasion
for satisfying duties owed to God, in the same way that getting dressed
is an occasion to satisfy the obligation of kelayim. However, if we are
to take the category of mitzvot bein adam la-chaveiro seriously, then
we must recognize that Jewish law confers rights upon individuals, and
it is those rights that we are obligated to support. It is to those
individuals that our duties are owed. 117
We conclude this section by emphasizing the distinction
between the normative reasons for obeying the law and the substantive
116

For the kelayim prohibition, see Lev. 19:19; Deut. 22:9-11. For the obligation to
not harm one’s neighbor, see Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 378:1.
117
Of course, by fulfilling our responsibilities to other individuals—mitzvot bein
adam la-chaveiro—we are also fulfilling God’s commands, since He commands us
to respect others’ rights through these mitzvot. Our point is that we are not
exclusively fulfilling a duty owed to God. In our opinion, the individuals who belong
to the “no rights in Jewish law” camp, like Hart, believe that when we obey the
interpersonal rules of Jewish law, we are exclusively fulfilling an obligation owed to
God. See supra text at note 99.
One way of explicating our position, to give the reader more intuitive
traction on our claim, is through the fact that God created individuals with tzelem
elokim (the divine image). See Genesis 1:27. This metaphysical fact makes it the
case that individuals are endowed with halakhic-legal rights and powers. For an
example of the idea that certain obligations between individuals flow from their
special status of being endowed with tzelem elokim, see Genesis 9, 6. As beings
created in the image of God, we owe other individuals certain duties and obligations,
over which they are small-scale sovereigns. Id. See also Midrash Rabbah, Bereshit
24:7. Many of the mitzvot bein adam la-chaveiro can be understood as deriving from
the special metaphysical and moral status of persons. Id. Again, it is God who
endows people with special status; but, given that endowment, humans possess rights
and entitlements that are correlative of duties that are genuinely owed to them. In
this sense, our halakhic duties to others—bein adam la-chaveiro—impose rights and
are fundamentally different from obligations owed exclusively to God such as
kelayim (forbidden mixtures).
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content of the law’s provisions. We have argued that the substantive
provisions of Jewish law confer genuine rights upon individuals. We
maintain that this is consistent with Rabbi Lichtenstein’s observation
that the normative basis of Jewish law derives from the fact that we
are obligated to obey God’s commands. 118 The duty to obey the law
is quite another matter from the substantive content of the law’s
provisions. To be sure, theorists working within what Cover describes
as a rights-based western tradition also endorse a duty to obey the
law.119
V.

CONCLUSION

We have argued against the thesis that denies the existence of
individual rights in Jewish law. Professor Cover and Rabbi
Lichtenstein have emphasized that Jewish law is primarily organized
around obligations. We believe that the reception of their position has
obscured the central, if quiet, role that rights play in Jewish law.
Failure to appreciate the important role of rights in Jewish law leaves
us with an incomplete interpretation of many mitzvot, and it does
violence to the integrity of mitzvot bein adam la-chaveiro
(interpersonal mitzvot). A complete interpretation of Jewish law must
take into account both rights and duties.
To be clear, it is not our goal in this article to contend that
Judaism is a rights-based system identical to that of West. Nor do we
claim that Judaism is primarily a rights-based system. We take no
position on the matter. Rather, our modest goal in this article is to
demonstrate that individual rights do exist in Jewish law, and that those
rights are central to our understanding of a host of mitzvot bein adam
la-chaveiro.
Comparative law is a double-edged sword. In recent years it
has been criticized for failing to take seriously the distinctiveness and
the integrity of each disparate legal system. 120 Yet, in the instant
118

Lichtenstein, supra note 41, at 4.
See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press, 1st ed. 1971); RAZ,
supra note 78. Thus, these theorists clearly perceive no inconsistency between a
system of law organized around individuals’ rights and a normative duty to obey the
law.
120
See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, From Doctrine to Devotion: The Jewish
Comparative Law Project, 67 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 685, 686 (2019) (referencing both
Suzanne Stone and Samuel J. Levine’s comments on the “flattening impulse” of the
comparative law project).
119
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discussion of rights in Jewish law, we believe the opposite is the case.
By attempting to illustrate the distinctiveness of the different bodies of
law, the comparative law enterprise has persuaded itself of substantive,
categorical differences between Jewish law and Western law where
only rhetorical ones exist.
With respect to the present topic of rights in Jewish law, we
believe that the drive to impose categorical differences on the two legal
systems threatens the integrity of the fundamental substance of Jewish
law. This is because it is this drive that has led theorists to deny the
existence of one of its central legal categories: rights. While we readily
concede that the English word “right” is not indigenous to Jewish law,
the concept that the word represents is central to it. Here, then, the
tools of comparative law allow us to give a voice to the quiet categories
of Jewish law that might otherwise go unnoticed.
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